Two opinion pieces today highlight Britain’s post-EU situation well. Tunku Vadarajan highlights the change in relative diplomatic status between Britain and France. He contends that France is the United States’ new principle ally among European great powers as evinced by the state visit of Marcon last week. This is at the expense of Britain, because a Britain outside the EU is no longer consequential.
The second piece by Ted Brumond puts a spotlight on the decline of the RAF and British military generally. The Royal Navy is now so small that it can field only 5 frigates at a time. The Army has only 227 main battle tanks. Budget cuts have cut deeply in the UK’s ability to project power in any meaningful way.
These are two sides of the same coin. A Britain outside the EU has a smaller “continental commitment.” Whether Britain should be engaged on the European continent and prepared to wage a land war or not, has always been at the heart of defense politics. Armies are expensive and furthermore, the Army is organized on the regimental system. The basic organizational unit in the British Army is a regiment of about 3 battalions of combined arms and self-supporting. It is an ideal way of organizing for low-intensity conflict (LIC) and military operations other than war (MOOTW). The British Army is a professional volunteer force recruited geographically into regiments. A regiment’s smaller size, close to an American Brigade or a USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (however the MEU is purposely built and trained for expeditionary warfare). Its organization, size, and capability, the perfect solution for colonial policing. In the post-colonial era, the regiment has transitioned well to counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and armed humanitarian operations. You could say that the British Army’s character was determined by empire (the American Revolution, being the first of many LICs the British Army fought).
The British Army is not built to wage total war with massed forces. Only were it organized on the basis of the division could it be considered a force for waging continental war against the Russians. British Army doctrine is focused on maneuver (much like the USMC), because they expect to be outgunned and outmanned.
More disturbing in the Weekly Spectator piece is the decline of the Royal Navy. With empire now a generation in the past and the Cold War over, a substantial peace dividend was harvested (navies are exceedingly expensive to build and maintain). The US Navy took over responsibility for providing the global public good of policing the global maritime commons (a mission the US has been trying to shirk since the end of the Cold War, because it is expensive). The Royal Navy did not need to be as large. However, it would appear that perhaps too much peace dividend has been harvested. I say this, because 5 frigates and a couple of submarines is not enough ASW capability to police the coasts, let alone enough firepower and presence to impose a blockade of Europe. Russian submarines will prowl the North Atlantic.
This decline in RN capability could be an additional reason for US diplomatic disengagement unmentioned by Vadarajan. The RN won’t matter in a European conflict.
In the modern era Britain has always avoided a continental commitment where possible. From one perspective, Brexit is about precisely that issue. After the Second World War, Britain appeared to double down on a continental commitment in order forstall another European total war. Part of that commitment was not merely NATO, but participating in the EEC/EU in order to have influence on the continent, however the cost of participation in the EU project rose higher than the immediate benefit of participation. Brexit is a retreat from the continental commitment, which has always happened with extended peace time.
Which brings me to France. Vadarajan, ably points out the reasons for increasing US engagement with France. Post Brexit, the US wants to have influence, and France is a powerful partner in the EU. Furthermore, France also is not the complete military basket case that Germany is.
This is not to say that France will ever be as close to operating with US Forces the way the British Army has. Language and cultural barriers will make that difficult. This is not to say that there aren’t substantial differences between British and American strategic culture. For example, British military doctrine is based on maneuver and harrassment, whereas, American military doctrine has been shaped by the Civil War, World War II, and Vietnam towards waging total war and not LIC. It is still division centric and geared towards fighting total war, even after more than a decade of LIC in Southwest Asia. The US may come to work more closely with French forces over time. This is particularly true of deterrence missions in Europe (e.g., tripwire deployment in Eastern Europe) and LIC/MOOTW in Africa (e.g., Mali where French and US forces are deployed to increase state security and combat Islamist forces).
Where does that leave Britain viz. the US relationship? It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Britain could forge a truly consequential trade relationship with North America via NAFTA or some other new Multilateral arrangement, however, the “special relationship” is probably over in the new world disorder. Britain has returned to a geopolitical situation similar to before the Elizabethan age–a territorial defense Army and a Navy too small to protect Albion’s interests beyond the Channel and sometimes not even that.